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Cake day: June 23rd, 2023

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  • Back in the 90’s before the days of Windows 3.0 I had to debug a memory manager written by a brilliant but somewhat odd guy. Among other thing I stumbled across:

    • A temporary variable called “handy” because it was useful in a number of situations.
    • Another one called son_of_handy, used in conjunction with handy.
    • Blocks of memory were referred to as cookies.
    • Cookies had a flag called shit_cookie_corrupt that would get set if the block of memory was suspected of being corrupt.
    • Each time a cookie was found to be corrupt then the function OhShit() was called.
    • If too many cookies were corrupt then the function OhShitOhShitOhShit() was called, which would terminate everything.

  • This reminded me of a glass artist named Josh Simpson who is known for his glass spheres he calls “planets” that have amazingly complex scenes in them. For over two decades he’s had what he calls the “Infinity Project” where he encourages people to hide them out in the open where folks are unlikely to find one. If you submit a proposal to him that he likes then he’ll send you two of his smaller planets, one for you to hide and one to keep for yourself.




  • Well OPSEC is the stated cause. Who knows how the person was initially identified and tracked. For all we know he was quickly identified through some sort of Tor backdoor that the feds have figured out, but they used that to watch for an unrelated OPSEC mistake they could take advantage of. That way the Tor backdoor remains protected.


  • Exactly. Tor was originally created so that people in repressive countries could access otherwise blocked content in a way it couldn’t be easily traced back to them.

    It wasn’t designed to protect the illegal activities of people in first world countries that have teams of computer forensics experts at dozens of law enforcement agencies that have demonstrated experience in tracking down users of services like Tor, bitcoin, etc.




  • Worked in a small Unix team under a broader IT department at a university. The manager of our team was awesome in part because his attitude was “I deal with all the university politics so you can focus on your work”. Anybody who has worked at a large university knows what the politics can be like.

    The VP of IT retired and the replacement was hired from an IT department at another university. The new VP’s overall policy was “We will do things this way because that’s how we did it at my old university”. Within about 6 weeks we had a round of “layoffs” that targeted our manager and one other manager that was also known to push back against the university politics. They were the only two people let go out of a department of roughly 100.

    Within about a year of that happening every last member of our tight knit Unix team left for greener pastures.



  • Oh there are definitely ways to circumvent many bot protections if you really want to work at it. Like a lot of web protection tools/systems, it’s largely about frustrating the attacker to the point that they give up and move on.

    Having said that, I know Akamai can detect at least some instances where browsers are controlled as you suggested. My employer (which is an Akamai customer and why I know a bit about all this) uses tools from a company called Saucelabs for some automated testing. My understanding is that our QA teams can create tests that launch Chrome (or other browsers) and script their behavior to log into our website, navigate around, test different functionality, etc. I know that Akamai can recognize this traffic as potentially malicious because we have to configure the Akamai WAF to explicitly allow this traffic to our sites. I believe Akamai classifies this traffic as a “headless” Chrome impersonator bot.


  • When any browser, app, etc. makes an HTTP request, the request consists of a series of lines (headers) that define the details of the request, and what is expected in the response. For example:

    
    GET /home.html HTTP/1.1
    Host: developer.mozilla.org
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.9; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
    Referer: https://developer.mozilla.org/testpage.html
    Connection: keep-alive
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Cache-Control: max-age=0
    
    

    The thing is, many of these headers are optional, and there’s no requirement regarding their order. As a result, virtually every web browser, every programming framework, etc. sends different headers and/or orders them differently. So by looking at what headers are included in a request, the order of the headers, and in some cases the values of some headers, it’s possible to tell if a person is using Firefox or Chrome, even if you use a plug-in to spoof your User-Agent to look like you’re using Safari.

    Then there’s what is known as TLS fingerprinting, which can also be used to help identify a browser/app/programming language. Since so many sites use/require HTTPS these days it provides another way to collect details of an end user. Before the HTTP request is sent, the client & server have to negotiate the encryption to use. Similar to the HTTP headers, there are a number of optional encryption protocols & ciphers that can be used. Once again, different browsers, etc. will offer different ciphers & in different orders. The TLS fingerprint for Googlebot is likely very different than the one for Firefox, or for the Java HTTP library or the Python requests package, etc.

    On top of all this Akamai uses other knowledge & tricks to determine bots vs. humans, not all of which is public knowledge. One thing they know, for example, is the set of IP addresses that Google’s bots operate out of. (Google likely publishes it somewhere) So if they see a User-Agent identifying itself as Googlebot they know it’s fake if it didn’t come from one of Google’s IP’s. Akamai also occasionally injects JavaScript, cookies, etc. into a request to see how the client responds. Lots of bots don’t process JavaScript, or only support a subset of it. Some bots also ignore cookies, and others even modify cookies to try to trick servers.

    It’s through a combination of all the above plus other sorts of analysis that Akamai doesn’t publicize that they can identify bot vs human traffic pretty reliably.



  • IphtashuFitz@lemmy.worldtoPrivacy@lemmy.mlMassive United States Data Breach
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    1 month ago

    Not easily. The scammer likely has your current address & contact info, but knows nothing about your history.

    To confirm your identity when you contact these reporting agencies they will use details from your credit history by asking detailed questions the scammer likely won’t know. For example it might be questions like these:

    • What kind of car did you purchase in 2005?
    1. Honda
    2. Ford
    3. Saab
    4. Jeep
    5. None of the above
    • Which one of these companies did you work for previously?
    1. IBM
    2. Pizza Hut
    3. Macy’s
    4. Jiffy Lube
    5. None of the above

    They’ll throw 3 or 4 questions like these at you that you’ll have to answer correctly. They might involve places you used to live, banks you have had accounts with, etc. The chances of a scammer with your SSN knowing all these details about you is pretty tiny.


  • The credit monitoring companies have your up-to-date contact information (and verified) when you put the freeze in place. Now, should a third party try to open an account, etc. in your name it should be blocked from happening and the credit monitoring company should contact you.

    If a scammer tries to unfreeze or otherwise modify your account with them they should also contact you.

    If/when they contact you or you request your account be unfrozen then they’ll use old credit history to confirm your identity. These are a series of three or four random questions that a scammer is unlikely to know. For example they might ask you what kind of car you purchased in 2005, then give you 4 options, like Ford, Honda, Jaguar, or BMW, and then also a “nine of the above” option. Then they might ask you which of the following street addresses you used to live at, and list 4 seemingly random addresses, one of which you might have lived at.